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SEC RULE 1Ob-5: CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD AND THE
LIABILITIES OF FIDUCIARIES
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent article,' one commentator listed six different areas in which
rule 10b-52 has been applied by the federal courts. They are: trading
on inside information, issuing misleading corporate information, tipping,
market manipulations, broker-dealer violations, and corporate mismanage-
ment.' Three relatively recent cases have added yet a seventh area to
those listed above - the activities of fiduciaries such as executors and
trustees. In the corporate mismanagement cases, the federal courts have
been using rule 10b-5 as a- tool to impose higher standards of fiduciary
duty upon corporate officers and directors. Several famous cases can be
cited as specific illustrations of this process. In Speed v. Transamerica
Corp.4, rule 10b-5 was used to attack a transaction in which the parent
corporation failed to deal openly and fairly with the minority stockhold-
ers of a subsidiary. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co." condemned the ac-
tivities of corporate officials trading on inside information and issuing mis-
leading publicity to the detriment of buying and selling shareholders.
The United States Supreme Court held that the complicated sets of
transactions presented in Superintendent of Insurance v. Banker's Life
and Casualty Co.( that amounted to corporate looting were actionable
under rule 10b-5. The common thread that runs through all of the cases
and dozens more like them is the idea that corporate officers owe their
shareholders a high duty of candor, honesty and loyalty.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries state courts and
legislatures greatly reduced the level of fiduciary duty that corporate of-
I Jacobs, The Role of Securities Exchange Act Rule lOb-5 in the Regulation of Corporate
Mismanagement, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 2- (19'3).
2 17 C.FR. § 240.10b-5:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
3 Jacobs, supra note 1, at 29.
4 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956). This is one of the last of the opinions in a large group
of cases.
-401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), ccrt. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
6404 U.S. 6 (1971).
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ficers and directors owed their shareholders.7 Using 1ob-5, the federal
courts have gone a long way toward restoring the early nineteenth cen-
tury idea that corporate officials are fiduciaries of their stockholders and
affording the stockholders protection from breaches of fiduciary duty.
The state courts have never reduced the standards of fiduciary duty that
trustees and executors owe their beneficiaries. The reason for this may
be that unlike the corporate shareholder, the trust beneficiary does not
usually have either a vote in selecting his trustees or the ability to quickly
and easily dispose of his interest and therefore, his need for protection
from the trespasses of his fiduciary by the courts would seem to be cor-
respondingly greater. Another reason might be that the economic pres-
sures of industrial development did not focus as heavily on the primarily
familial device of the trust as they did on the primarily commercial cor-
poration. In the past, the protection of trust beneficiaries has been sup-
plied by the state courts under their equity powers.
The federal courts have now begun to use rule 10b-5 to remedy
breaches of fiduciary duty in the context of trusts and estates. At first
glance, 10b-5 might seem to be an inappropriate tool for protecting the
beneficiary from breach of fiduciary duty. Most courts discuss 10b-5
cases in terms of misleading or missing information which deceives some-
one while most frauds committed by trustees and executors involve con-
flict of interest transactions, not requiring the deception or acquiescence of
beneficiaries since they are usually not involved in the management of
the trust. Analysis of the corporate mismanagement cases reveals that,
despite the courts' emphasis on deception, tb basic thrust of the cases is
to hold corporate officers liable for the same Kinds of acts that state courts
have held trustees liable for in the past. Thus, the federal courts have
used rule 10b-5 to recreate in the corporate environment the levels of
duty that previously existed in the field of trusts. Having done that
with lob-5, these corporate cases are now being applied to trustees in
federal courts thus closing the cycle.
While the substantive grounds of fiduciary liability under rule 101>-5
are relatively easy to discern, the procedural mechanism for enforcing the
duties created by 10b-5 has given the courts real problems in the 10b-5
cases against trustees. The shareholder derivative suit is a well articulated
device that has received great procedural elaboration over the last cen-
tury. Unfortunately, the trust analogy of the derivative suit is not as well
known. Furthermore, individual suits would often be inappropriate since
-Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?: Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus.
LAWYER 35 (1966). See also the dissent of Brandeis, J. in Louis K. Ligget & Co. v. Lee, 288
U.S. 517 at 541 (1933).
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multiple beneficiaries and unknown and contingent remaindermen would
have to somehow share in the recovery, hopefully without frustrating the
intent of the settlor.
Once the substantive and procedural problems in the application of
lob-5 to trusts have been conquered, there remains one final task - de-
ciding whether the federal power should invade yet another area that has
traditionally belonged to the states. This is the most difficult and in-
tractable question that is raised by the application of 10b-5 to the area of
fiduciary duties.
II. THE SUBSTANTivE LAW
A. Constructive Fraud
Rule 10b-5 is often described as an anti-fraud rule. An analysis of
the cases shows that if fraud is understood in a narrow sense, this de-
scription is only confusing. The cases concerning corporate and trust mis-
management are cases that involve breaches of fiduciary duty. The cate-
gories of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty are not mutually exclusive
but rather are traditional categorizations of a spectrum of conduct.8 In-
deed, the breach of fiduciary duty was often called constructive fraud in
the past. In his classic work, Equity Jurisprudence, Pomeroy points out
that while falsehood coupled with scienter is the distinguishing feature
of fraud, these elements are relatively unimportant in dealing with con-
structive frauds which are declared wrongful primarily on the basis of
equitable notions of fairness and policy."
For the purpose of understanding the trustee liability cases, the form
of breach of fiduciary duty or constructive fraud that is most important
is the breach of the trustees' duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty is "a
duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the
beneficiary."'" Thus, transactions that put a fiduciary in a position of
conflict between his own interests and those of the persons to whom he
owes his fiduciary obligations are constructive frauds. The archetypal
transaction that illustrates this principle is the sale of trust property by a
trustee to himself."1 In such situations, the beneficiaries of the trust can
compel the trustee to return the property to the trust or pay damages
even in the absence of real economic injury.12  This high standard of
8 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAw §4.7(2) (Supp. 1968).
9 3 J. J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 922 (5th ed. 1941).
10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959).
lid. § 170 comment b.
121d. § 206 comment b.
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freedom from conflict of interest in fiduciary transactions lead to Car-
dozo's famous comment that:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm's length are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sen-
sitive, is then the standard of behavior.13
B. The Growth of Rule lob-5 as a Rule of Fiduciary Duties
The directors and officers of a corporation were held to this same
standard of conduct in the early nineteenth century. In the late nine-
teenth and twentieth century, court decisions and statutes eroded the
fiduciary duties of corporate officers until little remained. 4 The creation
of a private right of action under rule 10b-5 has helped fill the gap in the
law left by the erosion of state law duties. As early as 1961, the SEC
recognized that the securities acts and especially their anti-fraud pro-
visions were creating a whole new federal corporation law with much
more rigorous concepts of fiduciary duty than prior state law had im-
posed.-" The 1963 Supreme Court decision in SEC v. Capital Gains Re-
search Bureau, Inc." held that fraud in the securities law was a broader
more flexible concept than the action of deceit was at common law.
Furthermore, the Court suggested that the anti-fraud provisions of the
securities acts should be interpreted broadly and remedially "as the courts
had adapted it [equitable concepts of fraud] to the prevention of fraud-
ulent securities transactions by fiduciaries ... "I"
The federal courts of appeals, despite the growth of fiduciary duties
under 10b-5, clung to the notion that fraud under 10b-5 must include
deception i.e., misleading information, and in so doing created a great
many analytical problems. In 1964, the Second Circuit decided two
cases in the area of corporate management that were to cause analytical
problems for years. Both O'Neill v. Maytag18 and Ruckle v. Roto Ameri-
can Corp." were derivative suits in which directors were accused of con-
structive fraud. In Ruckle, the plaintiff, a director of Roto American al-
13 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
14 Marsh, supra note 7.
15 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961).
16 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
'7 Id. at 195. See Patrick, Rule lob-5 Equitable Fraud and Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook:
Another Step in the Continuing Development of Federal Corporation Law, 21 ALA. L. RiV.
457, 470 (1969).
18 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
19 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
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leged that the defendants, who were the other directors of Roto American,
caused the corporation to issue 75,000 shares to Walton, Roto American's
president and a member of the board, for an inadequate consideration and
for the purpose of perpetuating his control of the company. A panel of
the Second Circuit held that there was a cause of action if the board of
directors issues to its own members shares of the company's stock.20 Essen-
tially it was a holding that self-dealing transactions are constructive frauds
in violation of rule lob-5. In the O'Neill case, the plaintiffs contended
that the board of directors of National Airlines consented to an unfavorable
unwinding of an uncompleted merger in order to preserve their control
of the company. Another panel of the Second Circuit, including two of
the judges who sat in the Ruckle case, held that there was no violation
of rule lob-5 because there were no allegations "of facts amounting to
deception."-" This position has a certain surface logic if one adheres to
the theory that the board of directors is the corporation, thereby making
it unreasonable to hold that the board of directors could deceive itself.
In Ruckle, the court said that "when it is practical as well as just to
do so, courts have experienced no difficulty in rejecting such cliches as
the directors constitute the corporation and a corporation, like any other
person, cannot defraud itself.12  The court in O'Neill tried to distinguish
that case from Ruckle by pointing out that there were allegations in
Ruckle that the majority of the board was involved in the allegedly
fraudulent transaction.2 '  Some judges in other circuits found this dis-
tinction to be lacking in real difference. In Dasho v. Susquehanna
Corp.,2 4 two of the three judges sitting on a Seventh Circuit panel wrote
a concurring opinion stating that misuse of the directors' power without
deception was, by itself, a fraud under rule iob-5. They disposed of
O'Neill with the observation that:
"[T]he failure of the defendant directors to perform their duty
presumably injured the corporation, and I do not believe it is sound to
differentiate between situations where the directors are unanimous in
wrongdoing and those where less than all were involved." ' 5
Other circuits tried to find a way to harmonize their conclusion that
O'Neill type situations were violative of lob-5 with the idea that a cause
20 Id. at 29.
21339 F.2d at 768.
22339 F.2d at 29.
23 339 F.2d at 768.
24380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
251,d. at 270.
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of action under the rule must include deception,:- The court suggested
that the shareholders should be regarded as taking the place of the cor-
porate entity so that the directors were deceiving them rather than the
corporation 27
Something of a conceptual break-through occurred in the Second Cir-
cuit with the case of Schoenbaum r. Firstbrook."8  The complaint al-
leged that the directors of Banff sold treasury shares to Aquitane, which
had three representatives on Banff's board and which owned a control-
ling interest in Banff, and that the consideration for the purchase was in-
adequate. A panel of the Second Circuit upheld a summary judgment for
the defendant on the grounds that there were no allegations that the
corporation was deceived since it appeared that the directors were fully
informed. Judge Hays dissented and argued:
"What the majority is actually saying is that since the directors were the
corporation for the purposes of the questioned transactions the corpor-
ation must have known what the directors knew. There is, of course,
no justification for interposing the corporate fiction between the directors
and the minority stockholders who were the victims of the directors'
fraudulent actions. In order to establish fraud it is surely not necessary to
show that the directors deceived themselves. It must be enough to show
that they deceived the shareholders, the real owners of the property
with which the directors were dealing."2
A rehearing was granted and the decision was reversed with Judge Hays
writing the new majority opinion. In that opinion the court held that
it was an "act, practice or course of business which operates ...as a
fraud" upon Banff, for Aquitane as a controlling shareholder, to exer-
cise "a controlling influence" over Banff's board with respect to the is-
suance of Banff's stock to Aquitane.30 With this opinion the Second Cir-
cuit joined the other circuits in condemning self-dealing transactions un-
der rule 10b-5 as constructive fraud.3? '
The analytical framework used to reach this result created almost as
- Shell v. Hensly, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3rd Cir.
1968).
-7 Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968).
:H405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). This is the en bane
rehearing of the opinion at 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
2, 405 F.2d 200, 215 (2d Cir. 1968).
30 405 F.2d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 1968). The first part of the quoted language is from rule
lob-5(3).
:I In Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972) a panel of the Second Circuit sharply
limited Schoenbaum; however, it must be remembered that Schoenbaum was an en banc opin.
ion. Furthermore, in the recent case of Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Corp., [1973-74 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L Rep. 3 94,853 (2d Cir. Oct. 31, 1974) another panel of the Second
Circuit followed Schoenbaum in a factually similar case.
1974]
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many problems as the one that had been used to prevent it. Judge Hays'
notion in his dissent to the first Schoenbaun opinion that the stockhold-
ers were deceived is of as little analytical value as Judge Lumbard's ma-
jority opinion that the directors could not deceive themselves. In the first
Schoenbaum opinion the strained use of legal fiction is clear evidence
that Judge Lumbard was trying to restrict the plaintiff to a state court
action for a breach of fiduciary duty action. In Judge Hays' dissent, the
creation of a new fiction should start a search for a better rationale.
Clearly, the minority shareholders weren't being deceived. Even if they
were omniscient there was nothing they could have done except sue, which
is precisely the action they took.
The answer to the problem is indicated in the second Schoenbautn
opinion. What had been condemned in this line of cases was not decep-
tion but rather "a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud."8 2 The language
of clause (c) of rule iob-5" lends further support to this line of cases.
Clause (c) uses the words "fraud" and "deceit" disjunctively. This can
be interpreted to indicate that the word fraud means something more
than the misrepresentation implied by the use of the name of the common
law cause of action for misrepresentations, "deceit." The self-dealing
transactions in these cases do not involve misrepresentation, but since they
are constructive frauds, they arguably are well within the boundaries of
"an act which operates as a fraud."
The Supreme Court removed whatever doubts remained about this
kind of an expansive construction of rule 10b-5 in Superintendent of In-
surance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.34 The facts of the case are diffi-
cult to comprehend, 35 but the ones necessary to understand the holding
are that Bankers Life sold all of the stock of Manhattan Casualty Co.
for five million dollars to Begole. Begole took control of Manhattan and
paid for the stock by selling Treasury bonds owned by Manhattan. The
Second Circuit dismissed the section of the complaint dealing with the
transaction on the grounds that there was no deception, and that rule
10b-5 did not deal with breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate officers. 80
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Douglas' majority opinion stated
that "the controlling stockholder owes the corporation a fiduciary obliga-
32 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (a): "to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,.
said.
S4 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
35 Roantree, The Continuing Development of Rule lob-3 as a Means of Enforcing the
Fiduciary Duties of Directors and Controlling Shareholders, 34 U. Pirr. L. REv. 201 has a
useful diagram of the facts in the case at p. 212.
36 Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir.
1970).
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tion. . . ."I Furthermore, in his discussion of the purpose behind the
enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Justice Douglas quoted
the legislative history of the act stating that: " 'disregard of trust relation-
ships by those whom the law should regard as fiduciaries, are all a single
seamless web' along with manipulation, investors' ignorance and the
like."'3 The facts in the case are undoubtedly closer to corporate looting
and waste than to the less spectacular kind of self-dealing found in
Schoenbaum, but the language of the opinion leaves little doubt that the
Court meant that breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate officials are fully
covered by rule io>-5. 3
This broad approach was followed by the Eighth Circuit in Travis v.
Anthes Imperial Ltd.!0 where the court held in the context of a tender of-
fer that
the self dealing alleged to exist here constitutes conduct actionable under
§10(b) and Rule lob-5. See Sup't of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., supra at 10, 92 S.Ct. 165. Here, as in Sup't of Insurance, the de-
fendants' self dealing was a violation of a fiduciary obligation to mi-
nority shareholders and not just 'mere internal corporate mismanage-
ment.' "41
It should also be noted that the securities transaction at issue in Bankers
Life involved assets and not securities issued by the corporation. This is
factually closer to the typical case of trustee misfeasance than those cases
that involve a 10b-5 violation by an issuer in connection with its own
shares such as Schoenbaum and Ruckle. Furthermore, the Court found
it irrelevant that the transaction was not a typical fraud, and did not af-
fect the securities trading process. Thus the Supreme Court gave wide
scope to both the prohibitions of rule 10b-5 and the persons protected by
it.
C. The Extension of Rule 1ob-5 to Trust Management
There have been three cases where a fiduciary has been held liable un-
der 10b-5 for constructive frauds. Two of them are district court cases
and one a court of appeals case. The first case to hold a fiduciary liable
for his conduct under rule 10b-5 was Heyman v. Heyman.'2 The plaintiff
in the case was Alice Heyman. Her father, Oscar, was a shareholder
along with the other members of his family in a close corporation, Oscar
37 404 U.S. at 12.
38 Id. at 11.
39 Id. at 13.
40473 F.2d 515, 527 (8th Cir. 1973).
41 Id. at 527.
42 356 F. Supp. 958 (S.D-N.Y. 1973).
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Heyman and Brothers. Oscar Heyman's stock was the subject of a re-
purchase agreement that obligated the corporation to buy his stock upon
his death for its fair market value. The executors of the estate included
one of Oscar's brothers. The trustees of a trust created by his will were
Alice's brothers and a bank. Alice was a beneficiary of the trust. After
Oscar died, the executors executed the repurchase agreement at a price
equivalent, not to the fair market value of the stock, but to its book value.
Much was made in the complaint of the allegedly fraudulent actions
that the defendants took to get Alice's signature on the sale agreement
despite the fact that her signature was unnecessary. The proceeds, which
the complaint alleged were less than ten percent of what was due, were
then deposited in the trust created by Oscar Heyman's will.
The opinion of the district court denied the defendants' motion to dis-
miss. The two chief defenses that the court dealt with were the "Birn-
baum" doctrine and the asserted insufficiency of causation between any
statements made to Alice and the transaction in question. Since the Birn-
baum problem goes to the question of who is entitled to enforce liabili-
ties, consideration of it will be deferred. 43  As for the defense that the
alleged misrepresentations to Alice did not proximately cause the trans-
action complained of, the court's treatment demonstrates the prevailing
confusion over the nature of fraud under 10b-5 and the ability of the
courts to reach the right results despite the confusion.
The gist of the complaint was that the defendants fraudulently in-
duced Alice into signing the sale agreement and failed to provide her
with material information about the transaction. The defendants asserted
that since Alice's signature and approval were not required in any way to
consummate the transaction, their alleged misrepresentations did not
cause, in a "but for" sense, the injury that was alleged.44 The defendants
relied upon a group of cases lead by Barnett v. Anaconda Co." In that
case the plaintiff sued for damages resulting from the dissolution of an
Anaconda subsidiary in which he was a minority shareholder. The district
court, acting on the assumption that the lob-5 cause of action requires a
material misrepresentation of fact causing injury to the plaintiff, dismissed
the complaint for failure to allege sufficiently causation-in-f act. The court
in Barnett gave as its reason the fact that
Anaconda could have consummated the transaction regardless of mi-
nority opposition, had it existed, and no internal corporate procedures
under Delaware law were available to the minority to block it. The de-
ception alleged in the case at bar neither brought about nor contributed
43 See text at note 63 infra.
44 Heyman, note 42 supra, at 966.
45238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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to the damage claimed to have been suffered either by the minority in
the representative claim or by the corporation in the derivative claim.4a
The court in the Heyman case, however, could not bring itself to buy
this nice but tough bit of logic. In rejecting Barnett as the controlling
authority in this case, Judge Bauman unfortunately did not hit upon a
simple analysis. He decided that another line of cases that hold that the
stockholders' ability to take non-voting legal and financial action to block
a transaction is a sufficient grounds upon which to find "but for" causa-
tion. In other words, but for defendants' misrepresentations, plaintiffs
would have sued to prevent the transaction. Furthermore, Judge Bauman
found that Justice Douglas' comment in Bankers Life to the effect that
rule 10b-5 protects creditors as well as stockholders was enlightening.
The judge went on to point out that:
Such parties were no more capable of preventing the Manhattan bond
sale than Miss Heyman was of blocking the resale of her father's stock.
The Court by implication rejected the argument that the possession of
power to effect a transaction insulates the perpetrators against subsequent
charges of fraud. Because the Court did not dwell on this point, and did
not even refer to the Barnett line of cases, one cannot be confident that it
intended to repudiate them. It is however reasonably clear that Bankers
Life comes down on the side of the broader view of causation that I
have adopted.47
The concession that the creditors in Bankers Life were unable to block the
transaction in any way should have demonstrated to the judge that his
approach to the problem was materially misleading him. The problem is,
of course, that the conception of rule 10b-5 that he applied was too nar-
row. Seen as a problem of breach of fiduciary duty there is no causation
difficulty. The position of George Heyman as both executor of Oscar
Heyman's estate and president of the purchaser of the assets of the es-
tate causes the transaction to be inherently fraudulent, and therefore the
alleged misrepresentations were mere surplusage and the question of
causation in fact was moot. The conflict of interest made the transaction
fraudulent within the reach of rule 10b-5 just as the transactions in cases
like Schoenbaum because such transactions constituted a constructively
fraudulent breach of the duty of loyalty. Thus the allegations of mis-
representations to Alice were irrelevant, since the transaction would be
equally fraudulent if she had not participated at all. Seen from this
viewpoint, Heyman demonstrates at once both the nature of the fiduciary
duty imposed upon the defendants and the confusion that arises from
failure to recognize it for what it is.
46 Id. at 776.
47 356 F. Supp. at 968.
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The next case to deal with trustee liability under rule 10b-5 was James
v. Gerber Products, Inc.,48 a court of appeals decision from the Sixth Cir-
cuit. According to the complaint, Sue Ellen Banker James was one of
three remaindermen beneficiaries of the separate trusts established by the
respective wills of Helen Gerber and Cornelius McCarty." The Old
State Bank of Fremont, Michigan, one of the defendants in the case, was
co-trustee with Mr. Schuiteman in 1966 and 1967 and became sole trus-
tee of both trusts in 1968 after Schuiteman's death. In 1964, the two
trusts held 57,670 of the approximately 8.5 million shares of Gerber
Products' outstanding common stock. Plaintiff alleged that the bank
sold 16,000 shares in 1966, 5,000 in 1968 and 1,000 in 1969, to Gerber
Products at the then prevailing market prices.8 0 At the time of the trans-
actions, the general counsel of Gerber Products and one of the members
of the board of Gerber Products were on the bank's five member trust
committee. Furthermore, the same person was chairman of the boards of
directors of both Gerber and the bank, while three of the other twelve
members of the bank's board of directors were officers of Gerber. The
plaintiff claimed that this substantial interlocking of the two entities
created a conflict of interest that made the transactions inherently fraudu-
lent under rule lob-5.
The complaint put forth theories of recovery based on both rule 10b-
5 and state law, the state law theory being brought under pendent juris-
diction. The prayer for relief asked either that the stock be restored to
the trusts or that a $250,000 cash equivalent be paid to the trusts, as
well as replacement of Old State Bank by another trustee. The complaint
did not ask that any damages be paid directly to plaintiff even though it
was phrased as being on her own behalf. The defendants moved to
have the case dismissed by the district court on the grounds that plaintiff
had no standing to sue under rule lob-5, because she was not a purchaser
or seller of securities. The district court dismissed the 10b-5 claim for
lack of standing and, consequently, the state law claim for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal.
In reversing the district court, the Sixth Circuit focused most of its
efforts on refuting the defendants' contention that the plaintiff had no
standing to bring the action under the Birnbaum doctrine. The defense
of lack of causation that caused so much difficulty in Heyman was either
not raised by the defendants or not discussed by the court. The Sixth
Circuit said quite simply: "The trustee's promotion of any interest other
48 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973).
49 A copy of the complaint was furnished to the author by counsel.
50 The court ignored a 1,000 share sale in 1969.
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than the beneficiary's, such as its own, would be fraudulent.""1 The lack
of analysis leaves the impression that the court considered the issue of
whether or not rule lob-5 had been violated on the facts of the case to
be too elementary for a detailed discussion. Unfortunately, as the court
in Heyman demonstrated, this is far from being true. Furthermore, the
James court made at least one bow in the direction of the Heyman court's
analysis when it noted that Ms. James did not claim to have any knowl-
edge of, or power to affect the transactions in question, but that had she
been forewarned she would have tried to block them. Fortunately, the
court did not try to push this line of reasoning very far.
A satisfactory analysis could have proceeded by showing how rule
lob-5 had been used in the corporate mismanagement cases to remedy
constructive frauds by corporate officers. The court could also have
pointed to its own definition of constructive fraud from the common law
corporate case of Seagraves Inc. v. Mount:
[Aicts which may have been done in good faith, with no purpose to
harm the corporation, but which are done by one who has placed himself
in a position of conflict between a fiduciary obligation and his own pri-
vate interests. 52
Furthermore, the court could have pointed to at least one state law case
in which an almost identical transaction was held to be fraudulent. In
Shanley's Estate v. Fidelity Union Trust Co.," the New Jersey vice-
chancellor held that it would be improper for the, trust company to sell
some of the securities that made up the trust where a half dozen or more
members of the board of directors were members of the board of direc-
tors of the company that wanted to purchase the shares. The James case
is factually almost identical with Shanley's Estate and fits quite well
within the definition of constructive fraud given in the Seagraves case and
discovered in the line of rule 10b-5 cases.
The most recent and perhaps most portentous case in this series is
Local 734 Trust v. Continental Illinois Bank and Trust Co.," a district
court decision from the Seventh Circuit. The reported case is a decision
ruling on, and for the most part denying, motions to dismiss in a group
of five related cases. The plaintiffs in the case were union pension funds
which had entered into various different types of relationships with the
defendant bank. For some of the pension funds the bank was an agent
with the discretionary power of investment, for others, it was a trustee.
51483 F.2d at 949. This must be regarded as a holding since if the court had thought
otherwise, it would have been obligated to sustain the district court's dismissal.
52212 F.2d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1954).
53 108 N.J. Eq. 564, 138 A, 388 (1927).
54 ['73-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 94,565 at 95,955 (May 10, 1974).
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The complaints alleged that the bank had loaned substantial amounts of
money to the Penn Central Railroad and that, in the process of making
the loans, it had learned detailed inside information about the railroad.
The complaint urged that there were inherent conflicts of interest be-
tween the bank's position as a creditor in its own right and its position
as a trustee holding stock for the benefit of others. The plaintiffs also
alleged that although the bank knew that the railroad was on the brink
of collapse, it bought common stock in Penn Central for the trust ac-
count. There was also a count in one of the complaints that alleged
that the bank lost a large sum of money in the stock of Management
Assistance Inc., an enterprise whose principal creditor was the bank.
Other counts of one of the complaints alleged similar problems with the
shares of other companies.
Although the defendants raised the purchaser-seller requirement of
the Birnbaum case as a defense, the court was able to brush it aside be-
cause of the recent Seventh Circuit holding that Birnbaum was not the
law in the Seventh Circuit. 5 In dealing with the main substantive prob-
lem raised by the complaint, the court first disposed of the contention that
the complaints stated causes of action "merely" for breaches of contract
and fiduciary duty and not for violation of rule 10b-5 by noting that the
Supreme Court had stated in the Bankers Life case that when rule iob-5
was violated the federal courts would give a remedy notwithstanding the
availability of a state court remedy.
The court, however, was not so firm in finding a theory to support
the complaint. It began by leaning in the direction of accepting non-
disclosure of the conflict of interest as the basis of rule lob-5 violation
by saying:
[T]his Court deems the defendant's alleged nondisclosure as trustee or
agent viz-a-viz the plaintiff as beneficiaries and principals, to fall within
the ambit of Federal securities law.5n
Then, in the next paragraph it quoted Bankers Life and cited Ruckle
and Schoenbaum. The court reached its conclusion that the complaints
state a claim upon which relief can be granted by pointing out the essen-
tial similarity of Heyman and James:
The defendant Bank endeavors to distinguish the latter case [James]
by noting that the trustee and the purchaser of stock were intertwined
through an interlocking directorate, whereas the fraud alleged in the in-
stant case is unilateral. We do not feel this is a cogent distinction. On
the contrary, the facts in the James case seem quite analogous to those in
55 Eason v. G.M.A.C., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
5 68 Local 734 Trust, suspra note 52, at 95,959.
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the instant suit. Both involve what are essentially fiduciary breaches and
the corporate entanglement in James is rather similar to the complex con.
inercial involvement the Bank is alleged herein to hare had. Therefore,
there may be Federal securities fraud regardless of whether the means
to accomplish it is unilateral or involves a third party buyer or seller,
The court recognized that the complaint before it and the James case
were both for breach of fiduciary duty and that such an act constituted a
violation of rule 1ob-5.8 The court concluded by rejecting the bank's
attempt to claim an immunity from rule 10b-5 under the banking laws."
The consequences of this decision, if upheld and followed, will be
far reaching. The dual role of banks as trustees and creditors has not
drawn that much scrutiny in recent years. It is easy to see that the
interests of creditors and shareholders are often at odds. The creditor
will often insist that common stockholders agree to limit their dividends
as part of the loan agreement. In some cases, the creditors will insist
upon the granting of mortgages as security, and, in other cases, the con-
trol over the company itself may be pledged. If worse comes to worse
and the enterprise becomes insolvent, as happened to the Penn Central,
the stockholders may have to engage in a lengthy battle with the creditors
to get anything out of reorganization or bankruptcy proceedings. Fur-
thermore, even when the trust holds debt securities they will often be of a
different class of priority than the bank's claim. Finally, the bank may
be inhibited by rule 10b-5 itself from properly performing its duties as a
trustee and selling a stock if it is in possession of "inside information."'
Where the legal owner of the securities in any of the situations is a bank
acting as a trustee, while the creditor is the bank acting in its own right,
the conflict of interest thus created is, according to Local 734 Trust, a
potential violation of rule 10b-5 that becomes actual when a transaction
is consummated. It is perfectly legitimate to wonder how, in the face of
this decision, banks can continue to operate trust companies. Given the
logic of the holding in Local 734 Trust, it would seem that the only pru-
dent course open to banks is to divest their trust operations. It would
furthermore seem logical that the only way a corporate trustee can avoid
the reach of rule lob-5 in the future is to avoid at all costs entanglement
in conglomerate financial enterprises that create conflicts of interest.
57 Id. [Emphasis added].
,8 Because the trusts in this case were pension funds they would also fall under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, §§ 401-414, 88 Stat. 829, in any future cases.
59 The position that banks are not immune from rule 10b-5 was also championed by SEC
Chairman Ray Garret, Jr. in a speech given in San Francisco on February 4, 1974. See Boise-
Cascade Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sr-c. L. REP. 79,461 at 83, 291 (1973).
0 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); Investors Management Co.,
Inc. SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 9267 (July 29, 1971).
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III. STANDING TO SUE
Although the courts have now reached the conclusion that for a fidu-
ciary to breach his duty of loyalty to his beneficiary is a violation of rule
lob-5, they have not been quite so adept at finding exactly the right solu-
tion to the problem of who has the right to enforce this duty. It is easy
enough to see in the abstract what a logical solution to this problem
should be. A typical private trust arrangement may have one or more
life beneficiaries who are succeeded in interest by one or more remainder.
men whose interests may be either vested or contingent and who may or
may not exist yet. Furthermore, there are often powers of appointment
and gifts over to charitable institutions to complicate this arrangement.
It is obvious that if one of the beneficiaries in possession is allowed to sue
a malfeasant trustee and recover damages for his own use and benefit,
several undesirable consequences follow. First, the interest of the re-
maindermen has been reduced without compensation. Second, the funds
may be given to a person who is not competent to manage them. Third,
the settlor's plan is frustrated. Fourth, even if the funds are impressed
with a trust, the management may have been made much more compli-
cated by having two trusts instead of one. These considerations plus the
fitct that any damages suffered are suffered by the trust res, indicate that
any damages that accrue should be paid into the trust. Furthermore, if the
transaction is being rescinded, the appropriate way to unwind the trans-
action is to return the securities in question to their place of origin-the
trust. Finally, the analogy of the corporate derivative suit, which is com-
mon in 10b-5 cases, and state law practice should be persuasive. The
logical solution then is for the trust beneficiary to bring suit against the
trustee on behalf of the trust.
Unfortunately, the first time this theory was advanced it was rejected
by a district court in Colorado. In one part of the opinion in Rippey v.
Denver U.S. National Bank,"' the court refused to allow the plaintiff-
beneficiaries to proceed on behalf of the trust against the trustees for vio-
lation of rule 10b-5 because, the court said, a trust is not a person within
the meaning of lob-5. The holding is clearly wrong since there is noth-
ing in the text of rule 10b-5 or the case law under the rule that requires
a plaintiff in a 10b-5 action to be a "person. Furthermore, the court
ignored the Supreme Court's often quoted instruction to interpret the
securities laws liberally.'-' It should be pointed out that Rippey was
decided in 1966, at the very beginning of the great expansion of rule
61260 F. Supp. 704 (D. Colo. 1966).
62 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW Fraud: SEC Rule lOb-5 79 n.50.1.
63 Jacobs, supra note 1, at 22.
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1ob-5, and is only a district court case. It would therefore seem that the
wisest thing to do with the decision would be to ignore it.
The court in Heyman did repudiate the other part of the decision in
Rippey that held that the plaintiffs could not bring the action as individ-
uals, since they had not been defrauded as individuals. Unfortunately,
the judge also added in a footnote his comment that
Nothing in what I have said should be construed as endorsing plain-
tiffs contention that she may maintain a derivative action on behalf of the
estate. I am not convinced by plaintiffs argument that such an action is
closely analogous to a shareholders' derivative suit. See Rippey v. Den-
ver National Bank, supra, note 8 at 715.04
As discussed above, this is not the logical solution to the problem, but
it is the solution which prevailed. Since neither James nor Local 734
Trust discussed this problem, and since the question is still unsettled, the
logical solution may still prevail in the future.
By forcing the beneficiary to sue as an individual the courts have cre-
ated still another problem. The so-called Birnbaum doctrine, or the
purchaser-seller rule, requires that a plaintiff in a 10b-5 action must be
either a purchaser or a seller in the transaction complained of.03 The rule
is shot full of exceptions,60 has been declared dead in at least one circuit7
and has been criticized by the S.E.C. and commentators. 8 It would not
be a problem in these cases if the beneficiary were conducting a deriva-
tive suit because the requirements of the rule would be satisfied by the
fact that the trust was a seller. If, on the other hand, the beneficiary is
suing as an individual instead of on behalf of the trust, then there is a
problem with Birnbaum since the individual was not the seller. The
court in Local 734 Trust felt it could ignore the problem because Birn-
baum is not the law in the Seventh Circuit. The courts in James and Hey-
man preferred to argue around Birnbaum. Since they should not have
considered the purchaser-seller problem at all, it is really not very impor-
tant how they got themselves out of it. In the end, both courts concluded
that as a matter of policy they should at least make another exception to
the purchaser-seller rule since if they did not there would be a wrong with-
64 Heyman, 356 F. Supp. at 966 n. 10.
05Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
66 Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967); A. T. Brod Co. v. Perlow,
375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco Inc., 384 F2d 540 (2d Cr.
1967).
67Eason v. G.M.A.C., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
r8 Rekant v. Des.er, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970); Kellog, The Inability to Obtain Analyti-
cal Precision Where Standing to Sue Under Rule lOb-5 Is Involved, 20 BUFFALO L REV. 93
(1970); Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule lOb-5, 54
VA. L REv. 268 (1968).
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out a remedy and the policy of Birnbaum, whatever it may be at this date,
does not command otherwise. Thus, the James and Heyman courts were
able to maneuver themselves out of a bind that other courts in the future
should not maneuver themselves into.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS BEHIND THE USE OF RULE
10B-5 IN BREACH OF FIDUCIARY Dui" CASES
The implications of the cases that have been discussed are clear, As.
suming that the jurisdictional means have been established, 9 trust benefi-
ciaries will be able to sue their trustees for constructive fraud in the fed-
eral courts instead of the state courts. The practical import of this is ob-
vious to most attorneys. Certainly the attorneys in Heyman, James and
Local 734 Trust cases were looking for some advantage in filing their
complaint in federal court rather than the local probate or general juris.
diction court. Since it does not seem that there is any real difference be-
tween the state and the federal substantive laws in these cases, the at-
torneys must have been looking for some procedural or practical advan-
tage. Two immediately obvious procedural advantages are the wider
availability of jury trial in federal court"0 and the broader scope of fed-
eral court discovery rules.7' On the practical side, they might also have
desired to obtain what many attorneys believe is the preferable atmo-
sphere of the federal courts. Whatever their reasons for seeking their
remedy in federal court, the plaintiffs and their attorneys were allowed to
stay and will surely be followed by others. The question becomes one of
the wisdom of a group of decisions that will increase the federal role in
regulating yet another area of activity.
There are at least two sets of reasons why the federal courts should
not intervene in the area of trust management. The first one relates
to the particular problems inherent in the use of the securities laws and
lob-5 as the substantive law in the field; the second goes to more tradi-
tional concerns about federal-state relations. As to the second set of
concerns, our attention must be focused on the quality of the state's in.
terest and the adequacy of the remedies the states provide as well as the
problem that the federal courts would face. The management of trust,
09 This may be a non-trivial problem. Imagine the trustee who deals with himself by tak
ing things out of one desk drawer and putting them into another without using any exchango
or the mails, etc.
70 For example, the rule in Michigan where James occurred is given in Abner A. IWol/ Int
v. Walch, 385 Mich. 253, 188 N.W.2d 544 (1971). Compare Ross v. Brnhard, 396 U.S. 53'
(1970). The Michigan approach is less expansive.
71 Compare MacH. GEN. CT. R. 302.2, which limits depositions to material that is relevan
and admissible, with FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
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is an area of the law in which the federal courts have always been re-
luctant to intervene-the creation and transfer of property rights. One
example of this reluctance has been the refusal of the federal courts to
entertain some types of probate actions under diversity jurisdiction 2
Furthermore, it is an area that often involves family relationships, such as
marriage arrangements, which are more within the competence of local
courts than the often physically distant federal courts. Furthermore, the
states have not been negligent in protecting the trust beneficiary. In the
case of corporate officers and directors, decisions and statutes have eroded
the duties they owe shareholders under state law thus leaving a great
vacuum for federal law to fill. In the area of trusts, however, there has
been little, if any, of the " 'disintegrating erosion' of particular excep-
tions."73 This is illustrated by the fact that the same facts that made up
the 10b-5 claim in James were also pleaded as a state law claim for relief.
The Supreme Court in Bankers Life said that ". . . there is redress under
§ 10(b), whatever might be available as a remedy under state law."74
But this cannot mean that the courts cannot consider the adequacy and
availability of state court remedies when determining whether or not to
extend rule 10b-5 into new areas. Certainly, the number of federal judges
and the amount of their time is limited. Complaints are constantly heard
about the "overloading" of federal courts at all levels from the Supreme
Court on down. If these complaints are true, then the federal courts
should be hesitant to take on a job that the states are already doing and
to all appearances doing satisfactorily.
The use of federal securities laws to regulate trust management raises
several problems that should give the courts pause before they proceed to
use them. The largest difficulty is that the rights and remedies of bene-
ficiaries and the duties and liabilities of trustees will depend upon the
nature of the trust res. To use the James case as an example, if the trus-
tees had sold Gerber a plot of land in a fourth transaction along with
the three stock transactions, the plaintiff might have had to go to state
court on the land transaction while staying in federal court on the secu-
rities law claim. 5 The possibilities of inconsistent determinations of fact
and law relating to otherwise identical transactions because they are in
72 Vestal & Foster, Implied Limitations on the Diversity Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 41
IMINN. L REV. 1 (1956).
73Meinhard, supra n. 13. See generally 2 A. SCOTr, TRUSTS § 170 (3rd ed. 1967).
74 Supt. of Ins. v- Bankers Life, supra n. 6, at 12. One would hate to think of the conse-
quence of returning to the bad old days of "adequate remedies at law" and what that would do
to the already confusing field of federal jurisdiction.
M The result might turn on the facts. If the sales of stock and land were factually inter-
meshed, the court might accept pendent jurisdiction. Errian v. Cornell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir.
1956).
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different courts would be disturbing. This situation can only be wors-
ened by the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.76 These provisions could cause confusion because the mere
change in the theories of the pleadings will deprive the state courts of
jurisdiction over matters traditionally within their jurisdiction. That
such a slight change in the theory of the pleadings should make such a
large difference is also troublesome. If the inquiry were dropped at this
point, the cases that have been discussed would have to be condemned as
unwise excursions by the federal courts into a traditional domain of state
law in which the securities laws are a poor vehicle to use to reach a just
result; however, the inquiry can not stop here but must be pressed on-
ward to consider what factors might make the decisions seem wise.
On the other side of the argument, a recent Senate committee report
points out that there are twenty-eight institutional investors with assets
of over five billion dollars.77 Some of this money is not invested in se-
curities, and some of the institutions are already regulated in their activ-
ity by parts of the federal securities laws and the federal banking laws.
Much of the money is held in trusts in the form of securities. The re-
port gives as an example the Burlington Northern Company. Of the
thirty largest holders of its common stock, eleven are nominees of four
banks acting as trustees. 78  The report points out, based on Burlington
Northern and some other companies, that there is a very serious possibil-
ity that this type of situation combined with interlocking directorates and
other financial transactions such as loans and deposits make "it difficult to
avoid self-dealing on the basis of inside information."70 This is a prob-
lem of the scope, complexity and economic importance which may well
justify the intervention of federal power.
To the task of coping with the challenge presented by the Senate com-
mittee's report, the federal bench brings two important qualifications.
The first one is independence. No matter how honest he is, the state
court judge may very well be reluctant to find that some of the most
prominent citizens of his community have been guilty of wrongdoing.
Furthermore, the need to get re-elected introduces disturbing pressures
into any system. The pressure of trying to preserve a local economy may
also tempt state judges and legislators to subject the relevant law to "dis-
integrating erosion." The federal judge appointed for a lifetime and re-
7 6 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1971 ).
77 B.N.A. SEc. REG. LAW. R. No. 234, January 9, 1974, at G-I. See also Lybecker, Regu-
lation of Bank Trust Department Investment Activities, 82 YALE LJ. 977 (1973). Morgan
Guaranty Trust is the largest on the list with 27.4 billion dollars of assets held in trust.
78 B.N.A. SEC. REG. LAW. R., supra note 75, at G-5.
7) Id. at G-6.
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sponsible for a nationwide law will be immune to many of these pres-
sures80 The second advantage that the federal courts have is superior
expertise in dealing with large-scale financial litigation. Complex and
difficult fact patterns presented by these types of cases call for an abil-
ity to think in terms that are strange to the average jurist accustomed to
a steady stream of criminal and negligence cases. The federal courts, on
the other hand, have, because of years of securities and anti-trust litiga-
tion, developed this type of factual expertise that is unmatched in the
states. Furthermore, the federal courts have achieved procedural sophis-
tication in handling big cases. The nationwide service of process features
of federal securities jurisdiction,"' and the judicial panel on multidistrict
litigation are resources that the states are inherently incapable of match-
ing.
VI. CONCLUSION
The federal courts may very well go about creating a federal law of
trusts paralleling the federal law of corporations that they have already
created under rule lOb-5. Of course, the considerations discussed above
may lead the courts to disregard or limit the cases. Whatever the courts
do, the decisions make it clear that Congress needs to fundamentally re-
consider the federal securities law. The current ALI proposal to codify
the securities laws would not seem to affect the James decision at all.'
While this may be laudable from the viewpoint of a codification and
restatement, it does not begin to tackle the substantive policy problems
raised by the development of "federal corporation law" and "federal trust
law." The shape and limits of the laws are something that Congress
should carefully consider. Over the last two centuries America has de-
veloped from a confederation of localities to a single national entity.
Just as the activities of corporations have for that reason drawn increas-
ing attention to the need for further federal regulation, so it would seem
have the activities of trustees.
Unfortunately, the congress probably will not act on these matters
very soon if at all. Therefore, the courts will be left to their own devices
and given the logic of the cases they will probably continue what they
have started. The results will not be completely bad if "the punctilio of
an honor the most sensitive .... " is vindicated.
Robert S. Schwartz
80See Palmore v. U.S., 411 389, 410 (1973) (Douglas, J. dissenting).
81 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. 78a (1971).
82 See ALI FED. SECURITIES CODE, T.D. 2 §§ 1301, 1402.
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